This essay critically examines HLA Hart’s conception of the relationship between law and morality as delineated in his most famous work, The Concept of Law. In evaluating his contention that there is no necessary conceptual connection between law and morality, Hart’s conceptions of the ‘minimum content of natural law’ and difference between legal and moral obligations will be analysed. It will also examine the moral implications of his account of ‘internal point of view’, which is the view of individuals who see rules as standards of appraisal of their own and others’ behaviour. This essay seeks to reveal the problematic nature of Hart’s contention on both normative and methodological grounds. It will, however, also defend that his contention remains a jurisprudential conundrum in understanding the role of law in the social context.
How to Cite:
Yeon, T., 2019. The Separability of Law and Morality as an Intriguing Conundrum within Legal Positivism: Lessons from The Concept of Law. LSE Law Review, 4, pp.63–73.